Introduction
Dominant thinking in economic theory holds that regulation imposes a cost burden on firms, causing them to reallocate their spending away from investments in innovation to meet the standards set by the regulations. On the other side, the environmental movement along with greater public concern about social health and safety has fuelled arguments that economic efficiency is a necessary sacrifice for improved social welfare. The "Porter Hypothesis 3 " goes even further, arguing that environmental, health, and safety regulation regularly induces innovation and may even enhance the competitiveness of the regulated industry. Schumpeter (1942) distinguished innovation, the commercially successful application of an idea, from invention, the initial development of a new idea, and from diffusion, the widespread adoption of the innovation (Ashford and Heaton, 1981 4 ). Based on this Schumpeterian definition of innovation, at the highest level of analysis, there are two competing ways in which government regulation impacts innovation. First, regulation places a compliance burden on firms, which can cause them to divert time and money from innovative activities to compliance efforts. Counter to this, and second, firms may be unable to achieve compliance with existing products and processes and thus, assuming that the firms do not shut down, regulation may spur either compliance innovation or circumventive innovation. Circumventive innovation occurs when the scope of the regulation is narrow and the resulting innovation allows the firms to escape the regulatory constraints. Compliance innovation occurs, when the scope of the regulation is broad and the resulting product or process innovations remain within the scope of the regulation. Firms' R&D efforts create new technologies, products, and solutions designed to satisfy customer needs that are not easily imitated by competitors and hence gain competitive advantages. This behaviour of a firm enables it to differentiate itself from other firms. This motivates a firm to focus more on innovation activity to survive in the global competitive markets.
In the debate of global climate change and contribution to GHGs emission from firms; so far number of research and policy papers has been published. Most of the papers deal with the implication of greenhouse gases emission on the behaviour of firms. However, studies that relate regulation or policy instrument such as ISO certification that might enhance the quality of product and minimise the output at firm level are few. ISO develops new standards in response to sectors and stakeholders that express a clearly established need for them. ISO standards are voluntary, and based on a solid consensus of international expert opinion. ISO standards are among the leading objective tools that assist policymakers in decisions related to public incentives, regulations, and use of standards to foster energy-efficiency and new 3 According to the Porter hypothesis, strict environmental regulations can induce efficiency and encourage innovations that help improve commercial competitiveness. The hypothesis was formulated by the economist Michael Porter in an article in 1995. The hypothesis suggests that strict environmental regulation triggers the discovery and introduction of cleaner technologies and environmental improvements, the innovation effect, making production processes and products more efficient. The cost savings that can be achieved are sufficient to overcompensate for both the compliance costs directly attributed to new regulations and the innovation costs. In the first mover advantage, a company is able to exploit innovation by learning curve effects or patenting and attains a dominating competitive position compared to companies in countries where environmental regulations were enforced much later. system is essential for an organization to manage environmental aspects like emission and handling of waste. It is important for the efficient utilization of resources and energy (Whitelaw, 2004) . Some of the benefits of the ISO 14001 certification are:
1. Reduction in insurance premiums: waste handling costs; water and air permitting fees; 2. Improved corporate image: strategic investment; improved regulatory relations; and 3. Evaluates system performance through management review and correct management system deficiencies Based on the discussion above, this study looks at the impact of regulations for the Indian manufacturing firms. The ISO certification is defined in terms of ISO 14001 families of certification that is energy saving technologies and firms that are involved in the energy saving technologies through the clean development mechanism in India. This paper estimates technical efficiency in the first step and further it tries to identify the differences in technical efficiency between ISO and Non-ISO certified firms. The analysis tries to find out the inter-firm differences in technical efficiency between ISO and Non-ISO certified firms.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section of the paper discusses the review of literature, section three describes the methodology and definition of variables, section four describes the results and final section concludes with a discussion.
Literature Review
Cohen (1979) reviews NRC power plant licensing procedures and finds that they negatively impact market innovation through compliance uncertainty due to regulatory delay, although she suggests that this may be worth the social benefit of improved safety and quality. Marcus (1988) there were no incentives for R&D that would increase the ability of scrubbers to control pollution. However, there were incentives to perform R&D to lower the costs of operating these scrubbers, and thus lower the costs of complying with the regulation. In contrast, the [sulfur dioxide] permit market established by the 1990 Clean Air Act provided incentives to install scrubbers with higher removal efficiencies, and thus led to more R&D designed to improve the removal efficiency of scrubbers. Hence, although innovative activity still occurred, the benefits of the innovative activity were redirected from the firm to society and the environment.
Sickes and Streitwieser (1991) use statistical analysis to examine the impact of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which altered existing well-head price controls such that gas prices could rise more rapidly to curtail shortages in the wake of the 1973 oil price shock. Sickles and Streitwieser find that both the technical efficiency and the productivity of gas transmission firms fell over the period [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] , which is indicative of flagging innovative activity. They attribute these results to a lack of flexibility in economic regulations that "could neither anticipate changing market conditions nor rapidly adjust to those changes". Jaffe and Palmer (1996) use regression analysis to analyze the relationship between the stringency of environmental regulations and innovation in U.S. manufacturing industries, and their results are mixed. While they find no relationship between environmental compliance costs (as a proxy for static stringency) and patent counts, they do find a statistically significant relationship between compliance costs and R&D expenditures. Noting that these results are somewhat contradictory, and the difficulty in classifying patent data by industry, the authors warn that their results cannot be considered conclusive. Furthermore, the authors cannot distinguish whether the increase in R&D activity is an indicator of market innovation or social innovation-they are unable to discern whether the regulation has caused firms to "wake up and think in new and creative ways about their products and processes,"
or whether firms are increasing R&D to comply with regulation at the expense other, potentially more profitable R&D investments. Lyon (1996) finds that compliance uncertainty caused by economic regulation has a negative impact on market innovation. He examines the regulatory "hindsight reviews" that were adopted by regulators in the 1980s in response to a series of poor investments made by electric utilities. Hindsight reviews assess whether a utility's investment was "used and useful" and is a cost-effective source of power, from which the regulator determines whether the utility's investment should be disallowed. Lyon runs a simulation using data from coalburning steam plants and finds that hindsight reviews can cause a utility to forgo investing in risky innovation and instead utilize more costly conventional technologies. Furthermore, utilities may cease making technological investments at all and instead switch to purchasing power from third-party producers.
Pickman (1998) performs a test similar to that of Jaffe and Palmer (1996) and finds that social regulation causes firms to change the direction of innovation, from market innovation to social innovation. She employs a more complex regression analysis and limits her innovation proxy to environmental patents thus she focuses exclusively on "environmental innovation" Pickman finds a statistically significant positive relationship between environmental compliance costs and environmental patenting, indicating that regulation does indeed spur environmental innovation. Her findings may go some way toward answering the question posed by Jaffe and Palmer (1996) : to comply with social regulation, firms tend to divert R&D expenditures from market-oriented innovation to compliance-oriented social innovation.
Bellas (1998) finds evidence that the moving target of continuously revised social regulations is not conducive to market innovation in the energy industry. Using cost data as a proxy for innovation, he performs a regression analysis to examine whether the desulfurization (scrubbing) units utilized by coal power plants underwent technological improvement during the regulatory regimes specified by the environmental performance standards of the Clean Air Act and the Power-plant and Industrial Fuel Act of 1978 importantly, the stringency of Sulfur emissions regulation is subject to increase as soon as costs fall. Bellas finds little evidence that the cost of scrubber units fell since their introduction, indicating that there had been little technological progress. Importantly, he observes that the market innovation of scrubbers is greater when power plants are subject to regulations that do not change in response to innovation, rather than moving-target regulations that increase in stringency as soon as costs fall.
Through regression analysis, Majumdar and Marcus (2001) find that incentives-based regulation of electric utilities leads to higher productivity "a proxy for market innovation" compared to command-and-control regulation. They analyze the time period around the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which established the system of tradable permits for pollution control. Their productivity measure includes total sales and energy disposition as outputs, and total production, transmission, distribution, employees, and purchasing power as inputs. Their results show that the productivity of electric utilities was lower during the prior command-and-control regime. Additionally, their results indicate that regulations that are stringent but flexible in terms of the firm's path to implementation are more effective at promoting market innovation. Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) also examine the impact of environmental regulation on environmental innovation, but they also include the degree of enforcement as an explanatory variable. They find a small but statistically significant effect of compliance costs on environmental innovation, as measured by environmental patent activity. They also test enforcement's effect on innovation using pollution inspection data from the EPA, but they find no significant relationship between enforcement and innovation. Instead of cost data, Popp (2003) examines scrubber innovation using patent counts. Through estimating a regression model, he finds that, contrary to Lange and Bellas (2005) , the level of market innovation decreased following the incentives-based social regulation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, but that social innovation increased: Lange and Bellas (2005) apply the model of Bellas (1998) to the system of tradable permits established by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and find more flexible incentives-based regulation to be somewhat more effective at inducing market innovation than the previous command-and-control regulatory regime. The amendments established a system of tradable permits for sulfur dioxide emissions. The authors' results show a significant drop in the cost of scrubber units following the legislation; however, when they looked at the rate of change in costs over time, it was no different than the rate before the regulation. In other words, the tradable permit system induced a sudden flurry of innovation, but the innovation then subsided, occurring at a lower rate than it did prior to the system, offsetting the increased innovation from the sudden flurry. The authors suggest that market-based policies may be useful for inducing sudden breakthrough innovation, but less suited for stimulating incremental innovation over time, although they offer little explanation for this theory. expert interviews, they find that government regulation precipitated by policy uncertainty can stimulate market innovation. And contrary to Popp (2003) , they find that the incentive-based standards of 1990 did not lead to more innovation than the prior regime of performance standards. However, this does not refute incentives-based regimes in general, they argue; rather, the incentives system simply came too late in the maturation of scrubber technology to have an effect. Huang and Liu (2005) examined the relationship between innovation capital and firm performance for top 1,000 Taiwan firms using a multiple regression model.
The authors included both R&D intensity and its squared term in their regression equation to examine the existence of nonlinear relationship between R&D investment and firm performance. Their analysis found that R&D intensity has a curvilinear inverted U-shape relationship with firm performance measured by return on assets as well as return on sales.
Popp (2006) 
Methodology
Technical efficiency is the effectiveness with which a given set of inputs is used to produce an output. A firm is said to be technically efficient if a firm is producing the maximum output from the minimum quantity of inputs, such as labour, capital and technology. For example, a firm would be technically inefficient if a firm employed too many workers than was necessary or used outdated capital. Here the concept of technical efficiency is related to productive efficiency. Productive efficiency is concerned with producing at the lowest point on the short run average cost curve. Thus productive efficiency requires technical efficiency.
Measuring Technical Efficiency
The actual production function of a firm is expressed as
The potential production function of a firm can be written as
Where, Q it = actual output for i th firm in the t th period, Q it * = potential output for i th firm in the t th period, X its = inputs β s = parameters that describes transformation process, v its = random noise components in the model which are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid) N (0, ² v ) distribution and independent of the u its u its = non negative random variables associated with inefficiency in the firms and assumed to be truncation of the N ( it, ² u ) distribution.
If the firm is efficient, the actual output is equal to potential output.
Thus,
Where, TE it = Technical Efficiency; u it = inefficiency
The error term representing technical inefficiency is specified as; u it = exp(-(t-T))
Under this specification, inefficiencies in periods prior to T depend on the parameter . As t tends to T, u it approaches u . Inefficiency prior to period T is the product of the terminal year's inefficiency and exp (-(t-T)). If  is positive, then exp (-(t-T)) = exp ((t-T)) and it is always greater than 1 and increases with the distance of period t from the last period T. The positive value of  indicates inefficiencies fall overtime, whereas negative value of  indicates inefficiencies increase overtime.
The above model can be estimated by the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE). Restricting 
Where, Q = Output; C = Capital; L = Labour; M= Material; and E = Energy,
The parameters of the stochastic frontier model, defined in equation (4), is estimated by using the FRONTIER 4.1 computer program under the 'production function' option, developed by Coelli (1996) . For estimating productive efficiency and technical change specified above we have used data drawn from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy.
In this study, gross output at constant prices is used as a measure of real output. Prowess reports gross output data in value terms (Rs. Lakh). Nominal values of gross output are deflated by the wholesale price indices for industrial goods. Wages and salaries of employees are considered for the labour input. Unlike other factors of production, capital is used beyond a single accounting period and measuring capital stock input is rather problematic. For capital stock we have followed, perpetual inventory method (PIM), as followed in Goldar et al. (2004) and many other studies on Indian manufacturing sector. Table 1 Technical efficiency. If we observe the minimum value for technical efficency on Non-ISO certification category, we can see that the minimum value for regulated firms always lies above the ISO firms. If we observe the maximum value for technical efficency on ISO certification category, we can see that the maximum value for these regulated and ISO firms always lies above the non-regulated firms. Table 2 presents time-variant average technical efficiency of ISO and Non-ISO firms. The ISO Certified firms achieved highest level of technical efficiency followed by Non-ISO firms. From the descriptive statistics we can observe that higher standard deviation is found for the share of debt capital, profit margin and firm age. This indicated that inter-firm differences are higher for the indicators such as debt capital, profit and firm age. Other statistical indices of the sample are presented in table 6 in detail. 
Empirical Results
The description of the variables used equation 5 and definitions are given in table 6 below. 
Conclusion
The objective of this research is to check the impact of ISO certifications on technical efficiency for a sample of manufacturing firms in India. We have used firm level data from CMIE PROWESS database for the period 2007-2012 (unbalanced panel data) . We have first estimated the technical efficiency for the sample firms and analysed the determinants of technical efficiency using firm characteristics. We conclude from the study that there are inter-firm differences in technical efficiency and they are systematically different based on firm age, firm size, debt capital, MNE affiliation, and ISO certification. Specifically, meeting the requirements of ISO certification has helped firms to achieve higher technical efficiency.
Therefore ISO certification has become an important factor in making the firms improve their technical efficiency. In addition, the result of this study also confirms that firms that are ISO certified and doing R&D are better off in technical efficiency when compared to others.
Hence, ISO certification, especially because of the conditionalities attached to maintaining the standards, appears to positively enhance the efficiency of firms in the manuraturing setor of India. The policy implications from the findings of this paper are clear and not too difficult to be implemented. 
